An unfortunate delay
After a controversy regarding the public burning of a Koran - an event linked to Russian media company RT - Sweden’s chances of acceding to NATO, at least for the next several months, seem to have evaporated, as Turkey will continue to block it. Given Sweden’s reliable aid to Ukraine and the unlikelihood of Russian aggression in Scandinavia, the delay is of more symbolic than practical importance. However, it points to a core problem at the root of NATO - as the organization has grown, its retention of single member vetoes, while crucial to maintaining national buy in, has made it unable to act quickly and decisively.
The liberal basis for collective security
Collective security is an important concept for advancing a liberal vision of international relations. In contrast to the anarchic world seen by Realists, liberals emphasize deep webs of connection between states. Many of these are cultural or economic, but openly declared mutual defense pacts are another key element of maintaining security. They allow for even small countries to exercise sovereignty against potential bullies (Estonia versus Russia, for example). While there are deeper questions to be asked about the nation-state as the primary organizational method of society, it has long been recognized by liberals as the most immediately promising venue, and thus respect for state sovereignty as a key element of a peaceful world view: Benito Juarez noted the tendency for liberals to see an ordered system governing relations between states as analogous to rule of law governing individuals when he proclaimed that “Between individuals, as between nations, peace means respect for the rights of others.” Warfare is the most grievous violation of this principle, and so a collection of states capable of punishing any belligerence is an invaluable tool in securing this order. Although they came to be viewed as symbols of Cold War rivalry, it is notable that NATO and the Warsaw Pact managed to prevent open conflict between their members - likely be eliminating ambiguity about which ‘junior partners’ in alliances would be protected - the kind of junior partners (Serbia, Poland) whose invasion had sparked the two world wars. Continuing this tradition is the most promising route to maintain peace - especially if it can incorporate new countries. This presents a new set of issues, however.
The problem as it stands
Currently, the problem is Sweden and Turkey are at an impasse - Sweden cannot abide Turkey’s demands regarding Kurdish groups in Sweden and their alleged support for banned organizations in Turkey, and Turkey cannot accept Sweden’s position. Even outside of this single issue, however, there is a vast gulf between the Nordic states and Turkey that will likely continue to widen; Turks are unlikely to change the opinion on Koran burning, for example, and Swedes will continue to have concerns about Turkey’s human rights. Nonetheless, Turkey’s position on the Bosphorus and status as the largest conventional army bordering the Caucasus make it a keystone of the NATO alliance. Expanding NATO to Georgia, Armenia, or Azerbaijan, or even further afield, will only intensify those diplomatic distances.
Another long-term complaint has also been simmering: the requirement that NATO countries spend 2% of their GDP on defense each year. This is designed to prevent ‘free riding’ - however, it is not broadly adhered to. This is to be expected: Spain and Portugal, for example, have little reason to spend vast sums on their armies when any credible threat is thousands of kilometers away.
The solution: mutually supporting regionalization
The best solution is mutually supporting regional blocs; below is one potential division:
But there are likely other, better ones. The basic idea, however, should be this: group countries with the peers they are most likely to immediately depend on. In the event Poland needs acute assistance, it is much more likely to get it from a Baltic state than an Iberian one; similarly, Romania’s needs will likely center on either the Balkans or the Black Sea.
Introduce levels of connection - and control
The key problem to solve is that a single veto is an enormous impediment to action, but it is necessary if we are expecting countries to go to war for one another’s sakes. Allowing two levels of association solves this problem to some extent - in a regionalized model, Turkey would be allowed to provide economic and diplomatic support to Sweden if the latter was attacked, but not to go to war itself - and vice versa. In exchange, Turkey would have to give up its veto power over the affairs of the northern bloc - a reasonable compromise would be that new members or major initiatives could be vetoed by a single member within the impacted bloc, or a by a majority of any other bloc. If some similar system is not implemented soon, I anticipate that Turkey’s continued policy disagreements with Northern and Western Europe will tear the alliance apart over the issue of Armenia, the Kurds, or some similar conflict.
Each regional bloc, though, would have (if Ukraine is included in both North and South) a population close to that of Russia and the military capacity to at least hold its own territory against it (or any other foe), especially if provided logistical support and supplies by the other two blocs.
Additionally, regionalization would solve another major dilemma - NATO countries with no hostile borders having to either slip below NATO defense spending or spend money on militaries they likely will never use. Portugal, for example, is unlikely to ever need substantial armored divisions, and indeed has given a large proportion of its APCs to Ukraine. A regional division that accepted this reality, and allowed - or encouraged - Western European countries to contribute by propping up the militaries of the other blocs rather than maintaining their own forces would mean that, in the event of any hostilities, more weapons would be in the hands of the soldiers most motivated to use them.
Allowing for future expansion
The current argument for regionalizing NATO is that key states obviously subject to Russian pressure - Sweden and Finland - are being kept out by the concerns of a state hundreds of miles away and largely unimpacted by Russian revanchism. Even if this initial hurdle is cleared, however, there will likely be others - and each expansion deepens the problems caused by a single veto. This is unfortunate because NATO has been phenomenally successful at decreasing military conflict between its members and safeguarding their security (even if it has arguably overstepped its bounds regarding the sovereignty of other states), and the model can stand expansion.
Dividing into multiple blocs would make this expansion much easier, without forcing untenable policy compromises onto its members - while leaving each bloc large enough to deal with any immediate threats. The US and Canada could be included in any blocs, in all of them, or simply exist as a bloc of their own - the reality is that, especially after the current war in Ukraine, any of the three is a match for any likely aggressor so long as it is under the American ‘nuclear umbrella’.
NATO, for all its faults, is still a valuable potential tool. However, it has grown too large for its current institutions. Regionalization would better align each area to its specific goals, while maintaining the capacity to defend every member in the event of attack.
Do you think regionalization would have any impact on tensions between Greece and Turkey?